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Minority Entrepreneurs and Fast Failure
Minority businesses now make up more than a quarter
of all U.S. businesses; yet, due to discriminatory lending practices, cultural aversions to debt, and limited access to capital,
these businesses continue to have higher failure rates. At the
same time, minority entrepreneurs are more likely to rely on
informal lending and less likely to turn to bankruptcy for relief
of debt. Doing so slows down failure for minority entrepreneurs—contra Silicon Valley’s new mantra, “fail fast”—and diminishes the minority entrepreneur’s ability to efficiently reallocate resources towards more productive ventures. In this
essay, I distinguish the minority entrepreneurial fast failure decision from that of the majority entrepreneur and propose both
private ordering and regulatory solutions that could help minority entrepreneurs fail faster. I begin by generally modeling
the fast failure decision for the majority entrepreneur, highlighting the social costs of failing fast, and describing how formal lending and bankruptcy affect this model. I then explain
how this model is distorted for minority entrepreneurs by discriminatory lending practices, cultural aversions to debt, and
access to legal counsel. I conclude by suggesting, and critically
assessing, proposals that could diminish these distortions, including peer-to-peer (P2P) lending platforms, mandatory educational programs, color-blind and big data loan and credit assessments, and minority loan subsidies.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Minority businesses now make up more than a quarter
of all U.S. business. 1 This level of entrepreneurship represents a
significant stride for minorities and could be the “key [for
many] to escap[e] poverty.” 2 That said, minority businesses also
continue to have higher rates of failure than non-minority
businesses. 3 This high failure rate is not necessarily a foreboding statistic in the context of entrepreneurship, but it becomes
detrimental when minority entrepreneurs fail to recover as
quickly as their majority counterparts. That is, “fast failure” is
the new mantra among entrepreneurs 4 and, while some criticize
this slogan as nothing more than Silicon Valley “hype,” 5 failure
can produce significant educational and innovative benefits. 6
1. Minority Bus. Dev. Agency, Fact Sheet: U.S. Minority-Owned Firms (Jan. 2016),
https://www.mbda.gov/sites/mbda.gov/files/migrated/filesattachments/2012SBO_MBEFactSheet020216.pdf (hereinafter Fact Sheet).
2. Reuben Abraham, Entrepreneurship key to escaping poverty, CNN (Jan. 23, 2012),
http://www.cnn.com/2012/01/17/opinion/world-economic-forum-reuben-abraham/; see also
Stephanie Rugolo, Increasing Entrepreneurship Is a Key to Lowering Poverty Rates,
GOLDWATER INST. (Oct. 29, 2014), http://www.goldwaterinstitute.org/en/work/topics/freeenterprise/entrepreneurship/increasing-entrepreneurship-is-a-key-to-lowering-2/; STEPHEN
SLIVINSKI, INCREASING ENTREPRENEURSHIP IS A KEY TO LOWERING POVERTY RATES,
GOLDWATER
Institute Policy REPORT (Nov. 13, 2012), http://www.realclearmarkets.com/docs/2012/11/PR254%
20Increasing%20Entrepreneurship.pdf; The World Bank, Innovation & Entrepreneurship (July
8,
2015),
http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/competitiveness/brief/innovationentrepreneurship.
3. Rafael Efrat, Minority Entrepreneurs in Bankruptcy, 15 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. &
POL’Y 95, 99, 121 (2008).
4. See BERNHARD SCHROEDER, FAIL FAST OR WIN BIG 143–67 (2015); RYAN
BABINEAUX & JOHN KRUMBOLTZ, FAIL FAST, FAIL OFTEN: HOW LOSING CAN HELP YOU
WIN 23–52 (2013); John Donohue, Fail Fast, Fail Often, Fail Everywhere, THE NEW YORKER
(May
31,
2015),
http://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/fail-fast-fail-often-faileverywhere; Fail Often, Fail Well, THE ECONOMIST (Apr. 14, 2011),
http://www.economist.com/node/18557776 (hereinafter Fail Often).
5. See, e.g., Jon Terbush, The 14 Most Bullshit Motivational Slogans in Silicon Valley,
GQ (Oct. 13, 2015), http://www.gq.com/story/the-most-bullshit-motivational-slogans-insilicon-valley; Rob Ashgar, Why Silicon Valley’s ‘Fail Fast’ Mantra Is Just Hype, FORBES (July
14, 2014), https://www.forbes.com/sites/robasghar/2014/07/14/why-silicon-valleys-fail-fastmantra-is-just-hype/#651681b324bc; Ajeet Khurana, Failure Is the New Buzzword, YOUR
STORY (July 12, 2013), https://yourstory.com/2013/07/failure-is-the-new-buzzword/;
6. See Fail Often, supra note 5; see generally BABINEAUX & KRUMBOLTZ, supra note
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These benefits, however, depend on the entrepreneur’s ability
to both fail and recover quickly.
The problem for minority entrepreneurs is that they are
failing slower than their majority counterparts. 7 This result is
likely due to their reliance on informal lending and aversion to
bankruptcy. 8 That is, without the contractual and legal mechanisms of formal lending and bankruptcy, minority entrepreneurs are unable to efficiently organize debt obligations and recover through a “fresh start.” 9
In this essay, I show that failing slowly not only inures
the minority entrepreneur’s ability to learn and innovate, but
also limits their ability to efficiently reallocate resources towards more productive ventures. 10 Thus, if “[e]ntrepreneurship
[is, in fact,] key to escaping poverty,” 11 and “failing fast” is essential to productive entrepreneurship, 12 minority entrepreneurs need access to contractual and legal mechanisms to ensure that, if their businesses fail, they fail fast. After
demonstrating this result, I distinguish the minority entrepreneurial fast failure decision from that of the majority entrepreneur and propose both private and regulatory solutions that
could help minority entrepreneurs fail faster.
4; ED CATMULL & AMY WALLACE, CREATIVITY, INC.: OVERCOMING THE UNSEEN FORCES
THAT STAND IN THE WAY OF TRUE INSPIRATION Ch. 6 (2014); GEORGE DEEB, 101
STARTUP LESSONS: AN ENTREPRENEUR’S HANDBOOK 104 (2013); SUNIL GODSE, FAIL
FAST. SUCCEED FASTER. (2013); SONIA LIN, SECRET TO STARTUP FAILURE: FAIL FAST. FAIL
CHAP. FAIL HAPPY (2014); JOHN C. MAXWELL, FAILING FORWARD (2007); BERNARD
SCHROEDER, Introduction to FAIL FAST OR WIN BIG: THE START-UP PLAN FOR STARTING
NOW (2015).
7. See Efrat, supra note 3, at 99, 121. Yet, it should be noted that “minority-owned
small businesses are not significantly less profitable than majority-owned small businesses.” Id.
at 74 (citing K.S. Cavalluzzo et al., Competition, Small Business Financing, and Discrimination: Evidence from a New Survey, 75 J. OF BUS. (1999)).
8. Id. at 121.
9. See infra Section II.C.
10. See Javier Gimeno et al., Survival of the Fittest? Entrepreneurial Human Capital
and the Persistence of Underperforming Firms, 42 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 750, 750–51 (1997); Fahri
Karakaya, Market Exit and Barriers to Exit: Theory and Practice, 17 PSYCHOL. & MARKETING
651, 659 (2000).
11. See sources cited supra note 2.
12. See sources cited in supra notes 4 & 5.
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This comment proceeds as follows. In Section II, I provide a general model of the “typical entrepreneur’s” 13 fast failure decision. This model compares the monetary benefits of
delaying failure with the social costs. From this model, I conclude that, in the aggregate, it is more likely than not that the
monetary benefits of fast failure are more valuable than the associated social costs for the typical entrepreneur. In doing so, I
highlight that this conclusion rests on the assumption of formal
lending and bankruptcy, decreasing the overall cost of failure by
lowering transaction costs and forgiving part of the typical entrepreneur’s debts.
In Section III, I turn to the fast failure decision for the
minority entrepreneur and describe the distortions on the typical entrepreneur model that affect her decision. These distortions include discrimination, cultural aversions, and lack of access to legal counsel. I critically discuss existing proposals that
could diminish these distortion costs and conclude that further
innovation and intervention is necessary.
In Section IV, I suggest a novel set of proposals, both
private and regulatory, for diminishing these distortion costs.
As a private ordering solution, I suggest using peer-to-peer
(P2P) lending to circumvent the costs posed by discrimination
and cultural aversions. I also suggest four incremental, regulatory proposals: first, a required educational program for those
who obtain SBA loans that teaches borrows about the benefits
of fast failure and bankruptcy; second, a truly color-blind loan
application process; third, a requirement that loan applications
being assessed using a process that avoids judgment of soft skills
and rests on statistical methods that have been proven not to
have a disparate impact on minority entrepreneurs; and fourth,
an SBA loan guarantee program that particularly targets minority entrepreneurs.

13.
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II. THE FAST FAILURE DECISION

While fast failure is a moral truth among Silicon Valley entrepreneurs, 14and online fora provide varied advice on when an entrepreneur should call it quits, 15 the general entrepreneurial fast
failure decision has never been formally modeled. 16 Thus, I
begin by creating this model, highlighting the key considerations of an entrepreneur deciding between accelerating or decelerating failure. After doing so, I further describe the social
benefits and costs at stake in this decision and argue that, in
most situations, the social costs of failing fast do not outweigh
its monetary reward. I conclude by explaining how my model
rests on the assumption that the entrepreneur take advantage of
formal lending and bankruptcy, as contractual and legal mechanisms affecting the speed and costs of failure and recovery.

A. The General Model
Most discussions of failing fast revolve around its educational and innovation benefits. 17 Yet, there is also a straightforward economic argument for failing fast: if you know your
Cf. sources cited in note 4.
See, e.g., George Meszaros, 15 Ways Successful Entrepreneurs Know When to
Give up or Keep Fighting, SUCCESS HARBOR (last visited May5, 2017),
https://www.successharbor.com/entrepreneurs-know-give-forge-ahead-01192015/; Knowing
When to Quit, ENTREPRENEUR (July 18, 2005), https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/78774;
Chand Brooks, Why the Best Entrepreneurs Know When to Quit, BUS. NEWS DAILY (May 21,
14.
15.

2013), http://www.businessnewsdaily.com/4520-entrepreneurs-know-when-to-quit.html.
16. Fast failure has been formally explored in the context of pharmaceutical and technological innovation. See, e.g., Rajat Khanna et al., Fail Often, Fail Big, and Fail Fast? Learning
from Small Failures and R&D Performance in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 59 ACAD. OF
MGMT. J. 436, 436–37 (2016); Jim Shore, Fail fast [software debugging], IEEE SOFTWARE Vol.
21:5, 21–25 (Sept.–Oct. 2004), http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/1331296/. In addition,
while never using the term “fast failure,” the concept has been explored in the context of barriers to market exit. See sources cited supra note 10. My model is consistent with these models,
but simplifies the variables.
17. See sources cited supra in note 5; see also Dean A. Shepherd, Learning from Business Failure: Propositions of Grief Recovery for the Self-Employed, 28 ACAD. OF MGMT. REV.
318, 319–20 (2003).
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business is failing, then it is best to accelerate that failure as
much as possible so that you can reallocate your resources to
more productive ventures. 18 A similar concept, market exit, has
previously been modeled by marketing researchers. 19 However,
to more adequately account for entrepreneurial behavior and
the distinctions between majority and minority entrepreneurs, I
produce a more general model below. 20
To begin, I model the “fast failure” condition; namely, if
failing fast is optimal, then the expected utility of failing fast,
E(F), should be greater than the expected utility of delaying
failure or extending survival, E(S):
(1) 𝐸𝐸(𝐹𝐹) > 𝐸𝐸(𝑆𝑆).

Further, I assume that, at time n1, the entrepreneur knows that
the business will fail, but also that the business can survive until
some time n2. Essentially, the entrepreneur’s fast failure decision is whether to fail at n1 or n2. 21
Next, I define the expected value of extending survival as
the difference between the individual social benefits accrued
from extending survival, 𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠 , 22 and the cost of failure at some
time n2, 𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛2 :
(2) 𝐸𝐸(𝑆𝑆) = 𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠 − 𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛2 .

Likewise, the expected value of failing fast is defined as the difference between the individual social costs of failing fast, 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹 ,
18. Cf. Gimeno et al., supra note 10, at 750–51; Karakaya, supra note 10, at 659.
19. See Gimeno et al., supra note 10, at 754–56.
20. I do not claim my model is in any way inconsistent with Gimeno’s model of thresholds of venture survival. Cf. id. I created a new model simply because I wanted to better account
for the distortion costs in Section III. For more detail regarding the unique characteristics of
successful and unsuccessful entrepreneurs, I recommend a careful read of Gimeno’s piece.
21. I forego this assumption and build a probabilistic model below. See infra equations
(2p), (3p) and (1’p).
22. See infra Section II.B.
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such as decreased civic capital, 23 and the cost of failure at some
time n1 prior to n2:
(3) 𝐸𝐸(𝐹𝐹) = −𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹 − 𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛1 .

At this point, an entrepreneur will opt to fail fast when
the individual social costs of failing fast combined with the cost
of failure at time n1 is less than the difference between the costs
of failure at time n2 and the individual social benefits of extending survival; i.e., an entrepreneur will opt to fail fast when:
(1′) −𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹 − 𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛1 > 𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠 − 𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛2 .

24

Next, I define the entrepreneur’s cost of failure at the
end of year n, Cn, as the difference between an entrepreneur’s
assets and liabilities at the end of year n. That is, assuming that
the entrepreneur has an annually compounding loan with a
term of n years, that the business’s assets depreciate at a normalized rate, and that the business will fail in year n, the entrepreneur’s cost of failure is
(4) 𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛 = −{𝑛𝑛(𝑅𝑅 − 𝐸𝐸) + 𝐴𝐴(1 − 𝑑𝑑)𝑛𝑛 − L(1 + 𝑖𝑖)𝑛𝑛 },

25

where R= the entrepreneur’s average annual revenue, E = the
entrepreneur’s average annual expenses, A = the value of the
entrepreneur’s assets in year zero, d = the annual depreciation
rate of the entrepreneur’s assets, L= the entrepreneur’s loan
principal, and i = the entrepreneur’s annual compound interest
rate on her loan. 26

23. For more examples, see infra Section II.C. One may argue that failure may increase
social capital in spheres such as Silicon Valley; however, because this appears to be a relatively
unique phenomenon, I do not integrate such benefits into this model.
24. Because the individual social costs of failing fast and the costs of failure are negative
values, the inequality is flipped.
25. I have placed a negative value in front of this expression because, if a business is failing, the value will always be negative.
26. I acknowledge that the threshold for failure is likely much more complicated than
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The following example demonstrates the operation of
this model. Suppose Joe is a typical entrepreneur looking to
borrow money for a business venture. 27 Joe needs a $300,000
loan and has two options: obtain a 5-year loan at a 5% compounded interest rate or obtain a 10-year loan at the same
rate. 28 Further, suppose Joe knows that, should his business plan
be successful, he will be able to pay off this loan (with interest)
after five years. However, if his business plan is unsuccessful, he
will know by year five that his business is failing and can survive
for only another five years. Finally, assume that at the termination of the loan, Joe will have no additional ways of capitalizing
his business and will either need to pay off the loan or close his
business.
Using the numbers provided above, and assuming that
(𝑅𝑅 − 𝐸𝐸)= $27,000 29, A = $200,000, and d = 10% or 0.1, Joe’s
cost of failure in year ten, 𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛2 , is approximately $148,932.70
while his cost of failure in year five, 𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛1 , is only approximately
$129,786.47. Thus, Joe would rationally choose to fail fast
when:
(1′𝑎𝑎) −𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹 − $129,786.47 > 𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠 − $148,932.70.

That is, Joe will rationally prefer the 5-year loan when the sum
of the individual social costs of failing fast and the individual
social benefits of survival is less than $19,146.23; i.e., when:

simply a function of assets and liabilities. See, e.g., Gimeno et al., supra note 10, at 753.
27. Once again, I assume “typical” means the average SBA loan borrower.
28. Note that the average SBA loan in 2015 was $371,628. Small Business Administration, 7(a) Loan Amounts, Fees & Interest Rates (last visited May 5, 2017),
https://www.sba.gov/funding-programs/loans. The normal rate for the SBA loan is 3%. However, lenders may vary from that rate by at most 2.25%. Id.; see also Average Small Business
Loan Interest Rates in 2017: Comparing Top Lenders, VALUE PENGUIN (last accessed Apr. 1,
2017), https://www.valuepenguin.com/average-small-business-loan-interest-rates.
29. Note that I have purposefully chosen a number that would entail Joe’s business
would fail. If I chose a number in which Joe’s business would be successful, then Joe would not
opt to fail faster.
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(1′𝑎𝑎′) 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹 + 𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠 < $19,146.23.

Figure 1 (below) depicts Joe’s cost of failure in year n,
Cn, based on the facts above. In addition, Figure 1 depicts the
additional annual cost of failure for each year Joe postpones
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
Notice that Joe’s cost of failure increases at a greater
failure,
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
rate as time progresses. This is largely the effect of Joe’s compounding interest rate on his loan and would be mitigated if he
made annual interest payments towards it. That said, he would
still suffer a significant cost by delaying failure.
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𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑

Figure 1. Depiction of Cn and for Joe’s hypothetical
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
business.

Before proceeding, I acknowledge and demonstrate that
the assumption that the typical entrepreneur knows outright
that their business will fail at year n is unproblematic. The objection runs that, because entrepreneurs often overestimate
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their success, 30 and because it is highly unlikely that an entrepreneur will know their average revenue and expenses before
beginning their venture, one must consider the probability of
failure in framing the fast failure decision. This requires including the coefficient 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛 , the probability of failure at time n, in
front of 𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛 in the expected utility functions described above.
Thus, E(S) becomes
and E(F) becomes

(2𝑝𝑝) 𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃 (𝑆𝑆) = 𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠 − 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛2 𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛2 ,

(3𝑝𝑝) 𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃 (𝐹𝐹) = −𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹 − 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛1 𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛1 .

The typical entrepreneur will rationally opt for faster failure
when:
(1′𝑝𝑝) −𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹 − 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛1 𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛1 > 𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠 − 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛2 𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛2 .

For a numerical value on the probability of failure, the
entrepreneur may look to the aggregate statistics from the
Small Business Administration on the survival rates of small
businesses. These rates follow an inverse, exponential curve in
which approximately 80% of businesses survive their first year,
50% survive after five years, and 33% survive after ten years. 31
Because, out of those businesses that did not survive, approximately one-third were successful and simply purchased, 32 the
entrepreneur may discount each non-survival rate by one-third.
Returning to the hypothetical above, suppose that Joe
uses these statistics to compute his probability of failure is 33%
30. David Thesmar, Financial Contracting with Optimistic Entrepreneurs, 22 REV. OF
FIN. STUD. 117, 117 (2009).
31. See Small Business Administration, Office of Advocacy, Small Business Facts (last
accessed May 5, 2017), https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/Business-Survival.pdf.
32. See Ryan Jorden, What Are the Real Small Business Survival Rates? LINKEDIN
(Sept. 15, 2014), https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/20140915223641-170128193-what-are-thereal-small-business-survival-rates.
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in year five and 44% in year ten. Joe would, therefore, rationally opt to fail faster when:
(1′𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝) −𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹 − (. 33)$129,786.47 > 𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠 − (.44)$148,932.70.

In other words, Joe will rationally opt to fail faster when
(1′𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝′) 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹 + 𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠 < $22,700.85,

which is only marginally more than the amount found in equation (1′a′) above. Thus, from this analysis, I have shown that
Joe’s decision to fail fast is hardly altered when considered in
the context of probabilities of failure rather than foreknowledge
of failure. 33
In the end, the general model demonstrates that the individual social benefits of delaying failure and individual social
costs of failing fast must be substantial for the entrepreneur to
decide to extend the survival of her business. In the next subsection, I describe these individual social benefits and costs in further detail and conclude that their aggregate social worth is, in
most situations, likely less than the monetary value of failing
fast.

B. Barriers to Exit
As mentioned above, failing fast may not be advantageous to an entrepreneur if the monetary benefits of doing so
are less than the sum of the individual social costs of failing fast

33. Note, however, that other studies have found that “[i]f there is uncertainty about
future payoffs, owners may be willing to accept low levels of performance with the hope that
conditions will improve.” Gimeno et al., supra note 10, at 751 (citing generally AVINASH K.
DIXIT & ROBERT S. PINDYCK, INVESTMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY (1994)). Because it is
unclear what “low levels of performance” means in the model above, these studies are not necessarily inconsistent with my finding that fast failure is still optimal under similar conditions
when probability of failure is taken into account.
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and the individual social benefits of delaying failure. 34 These
individual social costs and benefits belong to the broader category of an entrepreneur’s “barriers to exit.” 35 Below, I further
detail these barriers to exit by explaining how failing fast can
negatively affect individual stability and individual social capital. In addition, I discuss how delaying failure can increase an
entrepreneur’s civic capital. Finally, I contrast these individual
social costs and benefits with their aggregate counterparts.
The individual social costs of failing fast are connected
to individual stability and individual social capital. With respect
to individual stability, business failure can cause entrepreneurs
to suffer significant grief. 36 That is, even serial entrepreneurs
are motivated, beyond profit, by phenomena such as loyalty to a
product, a market, or customers, as well as proving oneself. 37
Further, if the entrepreneur is engaged in a family-owned business, failure can be even more detrimental because the business
is “a context for family activity and [an] embodiment of its pride
and identity.” 38 Finally, “fear of the unknown” can deteriorate
an entrepreneur’s confidence, 39 motivating them to simply stay
on course with their current failing venture. In total, these factors create significant grief in response to failure.
Some scholars have suggested that delaying failure can
diminish the intensity felt by entrepreneurs through the mechanism of anticipatory grief. 40 That is, just as prolonging the life
34. For simplicity, I do not discuss the benefits of innovation and education that are
often pointed to within the failing fast literature. It is questionable whether these benefits are
actually connected to failing fast in situations similar to the hypothetical above. That is, the entrepreneur has already failed, thus likely learned what caused the failure as well as thought of
ways not to fail in the future. If anything, delaying failure as discussed above simply postpones
the benefits of innovation.
35. See Karakaya, supra note 10, at 651 (citing M.E. Porter, Please Note the Location
of Nearest Exit, 19 CAL. MGMT. REV. 21, 21–33 (1976)).
36. See Dean A. Shepherd, Note, Learning from Business Failure: Propositions of Grief
Recovery for the Self-Employed, 28 ACAD. OF MGMT. REV. 318, 319–20 (2003).
37. Id. at 319.
38. Gimeno et al., supra note 10, at 751 (citing MARSHALL W. MEYER & LYNNE G.
ZUCKER, PERMANENTLY FAILING ORGANIZATIONS 78 (1989)).
39. See Karakaya, supra note 10, at 653.
40. See Dean A. Shepherd et al., Moving Forward: Balancing the Financial and Emo-
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of a loved one who is terminally ill diminishes intensity of grief
at their passing, prolonging the life of a failing business may
diminish the intensity of grief at the moment of failure. 41
Yet, delaying failure may also increase the emotional
commitment of the entrepreneur to the business venture
through further financing and time commitments, and thus intensify the grief at the loss of the business. 42 Thus, while an entrepreneur may find some benefit from delaying failure, the individual stability benefits of doing so are likely limited. 43
With respect to individual social capital, failing as an entrepreneur in some communities can lead to being perceived as
a drab businessman or businesswoman. 44 That is, past and future employees may become more skeptical of working with a
failed entrepreneur. 45 An owner who is willing to “redeploy assets in a more profitable arena” may injure relationships with
employees “who have developed firm-specific skills” and thereby, at the close of the firm, lack job security. 46 In addition, the
entrepreneur’s ability to redeploy her assets toward a new business venture may be diminished because her failure will lead institutions and her peers to view her as a riskier investment. 47

tional Costs of Business Failure, 24 J. OF BUS. VENTURING 134, 142 (2009).
41. See id. at 139–40.
42. See id. at 138–39.
43. See id. at 142–43.
44. Cf. Karakaya, supra note 10, at 653 (discussing how businesses that put out failed

product lines can appear to be “drab businesses”). I admit that failure appears to have a countereffect, as a right of passage, within Silicon Valley culture. See, e.g., Rana Florida, Why You
Should Brag About Your Failures, FAST COMPANY (Oct. 29, 2014),
https://www.fastcompany.com/3037704/what-it-really-means-to-fail-forward. However, such
an attitude is unique to the growing tech and biomedical industries and may not sustain itself.
See Rory Carroll, Silicon Valley’s Culture of Behavior . . . and “the Walking Dead” It Leaves
Behind, THE GUARDIAN (June 28, 2014),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/jun/28/silicon-valley-startup-failure-culturesuccess-myth.
45. See Karakaya, supra note 10, at 653 (citing M. Wartenberg, How to Merge and Survive, 79 MGMT. REV. 64, 64–70 (1995)).
46. Gimeno et al., supra note 10, at 751. The almost universal skill-set of programming
is likely why the fail fast mentality has become so prominent in Silicon Valley.
47. See infra Section II.C discussing the effect of formal lending on the model. Essentially, a business failure may decrease a person’s credit score.
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The individual social benefit of delaying failure for the
typical entrepreneur is that it increases to the entrepreneur’s
“civic capacity.” 48 Small business owners will often “leverage financial resources, cultivate political clout, establish civic alliances, [and] gain access to local and citywide neighborhood
planning debates.” 49 Further, “institutional embeddedness” creates more opportunities for entrepreneurial rent-seeking. Thus,
an entrepreneur that believes her venture could be successful
after obtaining certain government benefits, or who is concerned about influencing community projects, may rationally
opt to delay failure.
The social costs diminishing individual stability and social capital and the benefits of increasing civic capital are, in the
aggregate, less likely desirable to society than the monetary
benefits of failing fast. For example, while a surviving business
may provide individual stability (and potentially stability within
a community), 50 it may make it more difficult for a community
to attract investment because it will be identified as a stagnant
or failing commercial area. Likewise, while an entrepreneur
may take a hit to her reputation at the failure of her venture,
this decrease in social and civic capital will likely be even more
significant if it is discovered that the entrepreneur purposefully
sustained her business to retain a position of influence. Thus,
while the social costs of failing fast and the social benefits of delaying failure may be significant, it is likely more optimal for
the typical entrepreneur to fail fast.

C. The Effects of Formal Lending and Bankruptcy
Formal lending and bankruptcy both incentivize and deter fast failure. That is, while formal lending organizes the rela48. Stacey Sutton, Rethinking Commercial Revitalization: A Neighborhood Small
Business Perspective, 24 ECON. DEV. Q. 352, 366 (2010).
49. Id.
50. See Shepherd et al., supra note 40, at 134.
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tionships between creditors and debtors, it also relies on a credit market that limits repeat entrepreneurs, who formerly failed,
from receiving the same value from future loans. 51 Further,
while bankruptcy reorganizes debt obligations and provides a
“fresh start” to failed entrepreneurs, these benefits may be used
unadvisedly to allow an otherwise significantly failing business
to survive in debt without absorbing the full monetary cost of
such debt. I describe both of these considerations below as well
as their effects on the typical entrepreneur model.

1. Formal lending
I define “formal lending” to include all transactions between a borrower and an arm’s length third party where business capital is exchanged for a written contract to repay the
amount to the third party at a specific interest rate, under a
specific set of terms. By contrast, I define “informal lending” as
any type of lending transaction that excludes one of the above
conditions.
While informal lending may cut down on the entrepreneur’s initial transaction costs, it also leads to a slower, more
costly failure (amplifying 𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛 ) because it does not, formally, resolve disputes that may arise in the lending process ex ante such
as:
• When will the loan be repaid?
• How will the loan be repaid?
• What happens if part of the loan is not repaid?
• What happens if the borrower takes out another
loan?
That is, the informal lending increases transaction uncertainty,
including “the ability [of each party] to establish property rights

51.
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over their investments.” 52 Without establishing such rights ex
ante, these transaction costs are postponed and amplified. 53
In addition, informal borrowers “are more likely to de54
fault,” but less likely to participate in bankruptcy proceedings. 55 Because bankruptcy is a legal mechanism that speeds up
failure, 56 avoiding bankruptcy likely delays the failure process
and adds additional costs to the entrepreneurs. This practice of
avoiding bankruptcy is likely caused by the fact that informal
creditors are typically not given priority in the entrepreneur’s
reorganization of their debts. 57 Thus, informal creditors, who
are typically non-arm’s length parties, will pressure the entrepreneur to repay their loan before paying off other debts or
pursuing bankruptcy.
While formal lending is thus generally advantageous for
organizing debt obligations, it may also discourage entrepreneurs from speeding up failure due to its potentially detrimental effect on an entrepreneur’s credit rating. That is, if an
entrepreneur knows she will not be able to pay off her debts
with her current business venture, she may opt to postpone
failure, continue paying interest on her loans, and then use her
current credit to develop another business venture, from which
she would hope to profit. This type of entrepreneurial behavior
52. Harshana Kasseeah, The Performance of Small Firms: Does Formality Matter?, 28
J. OF SMALL BUS. & ENTREPRENEURSHIP 431, 432 (2016).
53. I have not yet located literature that makes this general assertion; however, I believe
the point is analogous to the common intuition among lawyers that carefully drafting contracts
will decrease litigation costs. The problem here would be that some informal networks develop
efficient norms that make formality in the transactions redundant. It is unclear whether informal lending has such norms.
54. Edmund J. Malesky & Markus Taussig, Where Is Credit Due? Legal Institutions,
Connections, and the Efficiency of Bank Lending in Vietnam, 25 JOURNAL OF LAW,
ECONOMICS, & ORGANIZATION 535, 537 (2009). See also Meghana Ayyagari et al., Formal
Versus Informal Finance: Evidence from China, 23 REV. OF FIN. STUDIES 3048, 3051–52
(2010); Efrat, supra note 3, at 119 (discussing specifically the actions of minority entrepreneurs).
55. See generally Amanda E. Dawsey & Lawrence M. Ausubel, Informal Bankruptcy,
TWELFTH ANNUAL UTAH WINTER FINANCE CONFERENCE (2002),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=332161.nh
56. See infra.
57. See generally Dawsey & Ausubel, supra note 58.
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is captured by the typical entrepreneur model described above
because it presumes to encompass the total possible debt an entrepreneur could reasonably take on as well as the total annual
average of her revenue over expenses, including any additional
ventures that might be pursued. Therefore, while formal lending may discourage fast failure in some instances, these instances are accounted for in the model when the behavior of the entrepreneur is aggregated.

2. Bankruptcy
Likewise, bankruptcy is the unique legal mechanism that
restores social and individual productivity to a failing firm. 58 It
increases the speed of failure by efficiently reorganizing the obligations of debtors as well as providing them with a “fresh
start.” 59 Yet, the “fresh start” policy may also incentivize entrepreneurs to delay failure, permitting the entrepreneur to continue running a business with skyrocketing debts because it will
be forgiven of a significant amount of such debt. Each of these
points are discussed below.
First, bankruptcy efficiently reorganizes the debts of an
entrepreneur, reducing the total cost of failure by reducing the
entrepreneur’s expenses. 60 Without this reorganization mechanism, “parties would [need] to contract out of bankruptcy and
design their own arrangements for the case of insolvency” on a
case-by-case basis, 61 which would likely create a “hold-out incentive [for] the last creditor to threaten to upset the reorgani-

58. See Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Bankruptcy Law for Productivity, 37 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 51, 88–95 (2002).
59. See id. For a discussion of the distinctions between the commonly used mechanisms
of Chapter 7, Chapter 11, and Chapter 13 as well as their utilization by entrepreneurs, see Simon C. Parker, Law and the Economics of Entrepreneurship, 28 COM. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 695
(2007).
60. See Georgakopoulos, supra note 58, at 69–70.
61. Id. at 70.
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zation.” 62 In addition, reorganization helps prevent false liquidations—i.e., situations in which a firm appears to be failing,
but is in actuality simply feeling the effects of a recession—by
providing an alternative to imperfect auctions. 63 That is, reorganization provides the entrepreneur with more time to better
evaluate her probability of failure, 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛 .
Second, the “fresh start” policy of bankruptcy essentially
forgives “the debts of honest insolvent individuals” 64 and,
thereby, speeds up the failure of an entrepreneur by decreasing
the cost of failure. That is, bankruptcy dampens the cost of failure, 𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛 , logarithmically by forgiving debts that would otherwise
essentially enslave the debtor; this is represented by the function 𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝑛𝑛 in Figure 2.

62.
63.
64.

Id. at 72.
See id. at 73–74.
Id. at 56.
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Figure 2. Logarithmic Effect of Bankruptcy on the General Model of Cost of Failure. 65

Without the “fresh start” policy, some entrepreneurs
would be forced to “devot[e] the whole or a considerable portion of [their] earnings for an indefinite time in the future to
the payment of indebtedness incurred prior to [their] bankruptcy.” 66 Doing so would essentially force some failed entrepreneurs into “pauperism,” as any incentive to work for “material
65. As this figure demonstrates, the cost of failure without bankruptcy increases over
time significantly faster than the cost of failure with bankruptcy.
66. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 245 (1934).
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remuneration” would be significantly diminished because such
remuneration would simply be passed straight to the debtors’
creditors. 67
This “fresh start” policy, however, could diminish an entrepreneur’s incentive to fail fast when the entrepreneur has already reached her maximum debt threshold such that all other
incurred debt would be forgiven. In other words, if an entrepreneur knows that filing for bankruptcy would likely mean
that additional debt does not need to be paid off, then she has
no monetary incentive to fail immediately instead of fail later
because her cost of failure will remain the same. 68
While it may be questionable whether an entrepreneur
could engage in such behavior and still satisfy the “good faith”
requirement, 69 the “fresh start” policy does significantly decrease the additional annual cost of failure for entrepreneurs
who have reached their maximum debt threshold (represented
𝑑𝑑𝐶𝐶
in Figure 2 as 𝐵𝐵). In doing so, the “fresh start” policy would
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
likely allow an entrepreneur with marginal individual social
benefits associated with delaying failure, or marginal individual
social costs associated with immediate failure, to rationally opt
to delay failure and thus create an aggregate social loss.

67. Georgakopoulos, supra note 58, at 59. The “fresh start” policy may also be utilized
to relieve debtors from certain contractual provisions that would slow down their ability to
reenter the market after failure. See id. at 83–86. For example, debtors have been relieved of
certain intellectual property agreements. See Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc. v. Richmond Metal
Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043 (4th Cir. 1985); Georgakopoulos, supra note 58, at 84, as well as
certain non-competes: see In re Register, 95 Bankr. 73 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1989); Georgakopoulos, supra note 58, at 84. Some have argued against the “fresh start” policy, claiming
that it pushes lenders to simply increase interest rates; however, such an increase would likely
be negligible because there are already significantly low odds of repayment in situations where
the “fresh start” policy is applied. See Georgakopoulos, supra note 58, at 59–60. Moreover, implementations of more forgiving bankruptcy policies has actually demonstrated a higher correlation of self-employment. See John Armour & Douglas J. Cumming, Bankruptcy Law & Entrepreneurship, 10 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 303 (2008).
68. Other than reallocating her resources toward more productive activity, or avoiding
tax consequences which would, at most, simply be a decrease in the taxpayer’s basis in her business’s property, see 26 U.S.C. § 108.
69. See Georgakopoulos, supra note 58, at 56.
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This result suggests further investigation of whether entrepreneurs could, or actually do, delay failure when they have
reached their maximum debt threshold. Such an investigation is
beyond the scope of this comment. For now, I believe I can assume that such activity is not incentivized by the “fresh start”
policy because because, even without this policy, most debtors
in the hole enough to rely on the policy are unlikely to pay off
their creditors; 70 thus, the fact that they would get their debt
forgiven is not dependent upon the “fresh start” policy. Instead,
this policy is aimed more at improving the recovery of such
debtors, incentivizing them to fail faster.
In the end, formal lending and bankruptcy increase the
entrepreneur’s speed of failure by organizing, reorganizing, and
potentially forgiving an entrepreneur’s debt obligations. While
the “fresh start” policy in bankruptcy may incentivize entrepreneurs to delay failure because they will only incur a minimal
additional cost of failure, this incentive likely does not exist due
to the “good faith” requirement and the actual benefits conferred by the “fresh start” program.
In this section, I created a general model of the fast failure decision for the typical entrepreneur, described and evaluated the social benefits of delaying failure and the social costs of
failing fast, and explained how formal lending and bankruptcy
effect the fast failure decision. In the next section of this comment, I now turn my focus to the application of this model to
minority entrepreneurs. In doing so, I specifically discuss how
discrimination and certain cultural aversions distort the fast
failure decision for minority entrepreneurs.

70.
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III. DISTORTIONS TO THE MODEL FOR MINORITY

ENTREPRENEURS
As mentioned above, minority-owned firms represent
more than a quarter of all U.S. businesses; 71 and, commentators
continue to point to minority entrepreneurship as a gateway to
improving impoverished communities. 72 Yet, minority businesses are also disproportionately underrepresented in bankruptcy proceedings due to a prevalence of informal lending,
73
and there is a dearth of discussion of how this phenomenon
affects the timing of failure for minority businesses. In this section, I account for costs that distort the fast failure decision for
low-income and minority entrepreneurs, 𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷 . In general, these
costs distort the entrepreneur’s expected value of failing fast,
𝐸𝐸(𝐹𝐹), by adding additional costs of access to mechanisms that
encourage fast failure. The fast failure function for the minority
entrepreneur thus becomes:
(3𝑚𝑚) 𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚 (𝐹𝐹) = −𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷 − 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹 − 𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛1 .

This entails that fast failure is rational for the minority entrepreneur only when:
(1′𝑚𝑚) −𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷 − 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹 − 𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛1 > 𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠 − 𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛2 . 74

The distortion costs I will focus on in this section are
discrimination, cultural aversions, and access to counsel. Each

71. Fact Sheet, supra note 1.
72. See sources cited supra note 2.
73. Efrat, supra note 3, at 121–23.
74. If one prefers the probabilistic model rather than the determinate future model, the
expected value of failing fast for the minority entrepreneur would be
(3𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝) 𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀 (𝐹𝐹) = −𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷 − 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹 − 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛1 𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛1 ,
and the minority entrepreneur would rationally opt to fail faster only when
(1′𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝) −𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷 − 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹 − 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛1 𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛1 > 𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠 − 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛2 𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛2 .
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of these costs diminish the minority entrepreneur’s desire for,
and access to, fast failure. 75 By diminishing the minority entrepreneur’s demand for and supply of fast failure, the resources of
minority entrepreneurs will not be efficiently reallocated to
more productive ventures as often as the typical entrepreneur.
This entails both an individual social loss to the minority entrepreneur as well as an aggregate social loss to the community.

A. Discrimination in the Formal Lending Market
One of the main causes for minority entrepreneurs’ disproportionate under-participation in bankruptcy proceedings is
that minority entrepreneurs rely heavily on informal lending. 76
This reliance developed because minority entrepreneurs generally have “diminished access to . . . debt financing.” 77 That is,
financial institutions are less likely to lend or provide adequate
rates to minority entrepreneurs because they generally lack sufficient information about them; this lack of information results
from the fact that often “minority entrepreneurs lack credit histories or required collateral, 78 have a lower loan application
submission rate, [and] have fewer ties to financial institutions.” 79 Moreover, because this lack of information makes mi75. See A. Mechele Dickerson, Race Matters in Bankruptcy, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV
1725, 1743–70 (2004) (arguing that the structure of bankruptcy law does not provide nearly the
same benefits to minorities as it does to non-minorities). But see Daniel Gill, Racial Bias Reflected in Bankruptcy Filings, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Nov. 1, 2016), https://www.bna.com/racialbias-reflected-n57982082087/ (discussing a recent panel which shared data that reflects African
American debtors are significantly more likely to file Chapter 13 cases than Chapter 7, when
compared to non-African debtors).
76. Efrat, supra note 3, at 122.
77. Id.
78. For example, in another empirical study, the interviewers learned that it took one
minority entrepreneur five years to develop the credit necessary to take out a small business
loan. See Sterling A. Bone et al., Rejected, Shackled, and Alone: The Impact of Systemic Restricted Choice on Minority Consumers’ Construction of Self, 41 J. OF CONSUMER RES. 451,
458, 465–67, 470–71 (August 2014).
79. Efrat, supra note 3, at 99, 122 (citing U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Expanding Financing Opportunities for Minority Businesses, 2, 3, 11 (2004) (unpublished manuscript), Ying
Lowrey, U.S. Small Bus. Admin., Dynamics of Minority-Owned Employer establishments,
1997-2001 9 (2005), https://www.sba.gov/advocacy/archived-owner-demographic-economic-
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nority entrepreneurs unlikely customers, some financial institutions simply engage in “ethno-racial discrimination,” precluding minority entrepreneurs from even getting the chance to apply for the loan. 80 This lack of information/discrimin-ation
practice quickly becomes a vicious cycle as often the only way
minority entrepreneurs can develop sufficient creditworthy information is by being able to take out loans at reasonable interest rates.
No doubt, discrimination based on race alone is technically prohibited by the The Equal Credit Opportunity Act
(ECOA). 81 The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB)
has further broadly interpreted this law to mean that a creditor
cannot, on the basis of race: “[r]efuse [a borrower] credit if
[they] qualify for it; [d]iscourage [a borrower] from applying for
credit; [o]ffer [a borrower] credit on terms that are less favorable, like a higher interest rate, than terms offered to someone
with similar qualifications; [and,] [c]lose [a borrower’s] account.” 82 Yet, aggregate studies of lending practices continue to
demonstrate that lending agencies discriminate against minority entrepreneurs. 83
For example, significant evidence shows that the average
credit rating of minorities is lower than their non-minority
counterparts. 84 Moreover, “loan denial rates are significantly
research (Archived), David L. Torres, Success and the Mexican American Businessperson, 6
RES. IN THE SOC. ORGS. 313, 314 (1988), Arnold C. Cooper et al., New Business in America:
The Firms and Their Owners 4 (1990) (unpublished manuscript), Tresa V. Menzies et al., A
Study of Entrepreneurs’ Ethnic Involvement Utilizing Personal and Business Characteristics,
20 CAN. COUNCIL FOR SMALL BUS. & ENTREPRENEURSHIP 5 (2003)).
80. Efrat, supra note 3, at 122.
81. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(1) (2012) (prohibiting “any creditor to discriminate against any
applicant, with respect to any aspect of a credit transaction on the basis of race”).
82. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, What protections do I have against credit
discrimination, CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU (last accessed on April 14,
2017) (emph. added), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/fair-lending/.
83. See infra notes 84-97.
84. Loren Henderson et al., Credit Where Credit is Due?: Race, Gender, and Discrimination in the Credit Scores of Business Startups, 42 REV. BLACK POLIT. ECON. 459, (2015);
see also Ken Cavalluzzo & John Wolken, Small Business Loan Turndowns, Personal Wealth,
and Discrimination, 78 J. OF BUS. 2153 (2005).
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higher for black-owned firms than for white-owned firms even
after taking into account differences in an extensive array of
measures of creditworthiness and other characteristics.” 85
In addition, discrimination is also prevalent at the
threshold inquiry stage, prior to the application and denial
stage. 86 For example, a recent study examined the types of questions asked from, and information provided to, persons of different races at lending agencies. 87 Three white, three black, and
three Hispanic men—each dressed the same, with almost identical financials—were interviewed after inquiring at the same
set of banks about a business loan of $65,000 to develop their
computer services business. 88 The white businessmen were provided the loan fees and loan terms significantly more often
than their minority counterparts. 89 Further, the minority businessmen were asked more frequently to provide financial
statements, tax returns, and bank account information. 90 In addition, they were also asked more frequently about their personal savings and investments, credit card debt, and auto loan
debt. 91 Lastly, the minority businessmen were less frequently
offered a business card, help with future banking needs, or help
to complete the loan application. 92
In a broader study, when whites were asked what they
sought for in a lender, they described the future lender as an
“equal,” “friend,” and “partner.” 93 In contrast, minorities responding to the same question simply stated they were looking
for a “minority lending company,” or “for a ‘personal bank’ be-

85. David G. Blanchflower et al., Discrimination in the Small-Business Credit Market,
85 REV. OF ECON. & STAT. 930, 942–43 (2003).
86. Bone et al., supra note 78, at 455.
87. Id.
88. Id at 454–55.
89. Id at 455.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 459–60.
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cause there was ‘no hope’ with the big banks.” 94 In general
“[m]inority consumers described structural marketplace barriers that prevented them from accessing financial resources.” 95
These practices of discrimination distort the minority
entrepreneur’s choice between failing fast and delaying failure.
That is, the minority entrepreneur faces an additional set of
costs, which make obtaining a formal loan with a quicker termination far less desirable. Further, as discussed in the next
subsection, perceptions of discrimination among minority entrepreneurs create cultural aversions to formal lending, 96 increasing the individual social costs of opting for fast failure.
One set of scholars has suggested that the SBA guaranteed lending program provides a framework for limiting, and
has actually limited, disparate impact discrimination in the
lending industry. 97 In general, the SBA guaranteed lending program attempts to solve the asymmetric information problem
that has led to the aggregate disparities in lending practices toward minority and majority entrepreneurs. 98
That is, the SBA views the problem as follows. Minority
entrepreneurs typically have lower loan approval rates, and
higher interest rates on those loans that are approved. 99 These
results correlate with the finding that while “minority-owned
small businesses are not significantly less profitable than majority-owned small businesses,” 100 they do “tend to have a higher failure rate relative to White-owned businesses.” 101 Further,
Id. at 460.
Id. at 465.
See Blanchflower et al., supra note 85, 932–34.
See Ben R. Craig et al., Small Firm Credit Market Discrimination, Small Business
Administration Guaranteed Lending, and Local Market Economic Performance, 613 THE
94.
95.
96.
97.

ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 73, 75 (2007)
(special issue “Advancing Research on Minority Entrepreneurship”).
98. See id.
99. See sources cited supra note 84. See also Blanchflower et al., supra note 85.
100. Craig et al., supra note 97, at 74 (citing K.S. Cavalluzo et al., Competition, Small
Business Financing, and Discrimination: Evidence from a New Survey, 75 J. OF BUS. 641, 641–
79 (2002)).
101. Efrat, supra note 3, at 99 (citing U.S. Dep’t. of Commerce, Expanding Financing
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both of these results correlate with the fact that “certain groups
of minority entrepreneurs have lower education and lower
managerial experience.” 102 These effects are all consistent with
the likely cause, namely the asymmetric information problem—
when a lender is assessing the likelihood of repayment of a minority-owned business, they will likely assess such a business as
riskier than that of a majority-owned business because there is
generally more information available about the latter. 103
The SBA’s solution is a guaranteed lending program
that partially alleviates this asymmetric information problem by
essentially subsidizing the minority’s higher probability of default with a guarantee on part of the loan provided to the small
business. 104 Currently, the SBA will guarantee as much as 85%
on loans up to $150,000 and 75% on loans between $150,000
and $5 million. 105 This guarantee not only increases the supply
of loans, but also lowers the interest rate on such loans, increasing demand by less risky borrowers and ensuring a higher repayment rate. 106
The SBA guaranteed lending program has produced “a
positive and significant impact on the average level of employment in a local market. . ., [and] the magnitude of this impact is
relatively larger in high-minority markets.” 107 Yet, while the
SBA loan guarantee program appears to increase access to capiOpportunities for Minority Businesses, 2, 3, & 11 (2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
Efrat)). This higher failure rate has been blamed on “inferior human capital as certain groups of
minority entrepreneurs have lower education and lower managerial experience,” as well as minority entrepreneurs’ “limited access to credit . . . due to lower asset levels.” Id.; see also Karlyn
Mitchell & Douglas K. Pearce, Availability of Financing to Small Firms Using the Survey of
Small Business Finances, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN. 1–2 (2005)).
102. Efrat, supra note 3, at 99–100 (citing U.S. Dep’t. of Commerce, Expanding Financing Opportunities for Minority Businesses, 13, 25 (2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author); Mitchell & Pearce, supra note 101.
103. See Craig et al., supra note 97, at 74–75.
104. See id.
105. 7(a) Loan Amounts, Fees & Interest Rates, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN.,
https://www.sba.gov/loans-grants/see-what-sba-offers/sba-loan-programs/general-smallbusiness-loans-7a/7a-loan-amounts-fees-interest-rates (last visited July 5, 2017).
106. See Craig et al., supra note 97, at 79–82.
107. Id. at 92.
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tal for minority entrepreneurs, there are no “direct measures of
whether SBA guaranteed lending is really reducing discrimination at the microecono-mic level.” 108 Thus, while the SBA guaranteed lending program increases the economic performance of
minority-owned firms and, thereby, reduces the aggregate distortion costs of reliance on informal lending, it remains unclear
whether it is actually combatting the individual distortion costs
of discrimination that minority entrepreneurs must overcome
in order to be fully on par with the typical entrepreneur in their
fast failure decision. In Section IV, I propose a regulatory intervention that would be modeled after the SBA guaranteed lending program, but specifically combat the individual distortion
costs of discrimination. 109

B. Cultural Aversions
In some minority communities, there is “strong[] social
peer pressure and shame associated with bankruptcy filing.” 110
In others, there are “culturally embedded aversions to undertaking debt.” 111 Further, perceptions of discrimination can produce, or reinforce, cultural aversions to both formal debt and
bankruptcy. 112 Each of these cultural aversions distorts the expected value of failing fast for the minority entrepreneur by increasing her cost of accessing and utilizing a culturally averse
tool that would speed up her failure. Further, these costs may
amplify the social costs of failure and the social benefits of survival already assessed by the typical entrepreneur. 113
Id. at 93.
See infra Section IV.B.4.
Efrat, supra note 3, at 122 (citing Thomas M. Begley et al., The Socio-Cultural Environment for Entrepreneurship: A Comparison Between East Asian and Anglo-Saxon Countries, 32 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 537, 539 (2001)).
111. Id. (citing Timothy Bates, Financing Small Business Creation: The Case of Chinese
and Korean Immigrant Entrepreneurs, 12 J. BUS. VENTURING 109, 120–22 (1997), Timothy
Bates, An Analysis of Korean-Immigrant-Owned Small-Business Start-Ups with Comparisons
to African-American and Nonminority-Owned Firms, 30 URBAN AFF. Q. 227, 231 (1994)).
112. See Blanchflower et al., supra note 85, at 932–34.
113. See supra Section II.B.
108.
109.
110.
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As far as I am aware, there is not significant work being
done to help minority entrepreneurs overcome these cultural
aversions. In Section IV, I propose a modest educational program that would help minority entrepreneurs internalize the
benefits of fast failure and decrease these amplified social costs.

C. Access to Legal Counsel
Minorities typically have significantly lower asset levels
than non-minorities. 114 Further, they do not have the same ties
to legal institutions as their majority counterparts. 115 For example, a recent empirical study found that “minority entrepreneurs in bankruptcy were less likely to have been represented
by an attorney in the bankruptcy process than their nonminority counterparts.” 116 This lack of representation entails a
delay in the failure of minority entrepreneurs as there will be
increased transaction costs at each step of failure. This distortion cost may be represented as either a delay on the timeline of
actual failure within the general model or an incorrect probability of failure within the probabilistic model. 117
A recent proposal to a similar problem of lack of access
to legal services suggests the equivalent of public defenders be
provided for defendants in debt proceedings. 118 Defendants
would need to qualify as “low income,” set at 125% of the federal poverty line, to qualify for legal counsel. 119 Such counsel
could inform the debtor of the intricacies of bankruptcy, 120 and
may even be able to help the debtor overcome her cultural
114. Alicia M. Robb & Robert W. Fairlie, Access to Financial Capital Among U.S. Businesses: The Case of African American Firms, 613 THE ANNALS OF THE AM. ACAD. OF POL.

AND SOC. SCI.

47, 55 (Sep. 2007) (“Advancing Research on Minority Entrepreneurship”).
115. Efrat, supra note 3, at 122.
116. Id.
117. See supra Section II.A.
118. Joel Tay, Note, Consumer Debt Collection in Massachusetts: Is Civil Gideon a Solution?, 11 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. S1 (2017).
119. Id. at S9.
120. Id. at S3, n.10.
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aversion to bankruptcy. This service could be provided for minimal costs, 121 and would likely increase aggregate efficiency by
decreasing the transaction costs in reallocating the individual’s
resources. That said, it remains unclear whether this proposal
would ever be adopted given the strong legal presumption
against a right to counsel “unless the defendant faces a potential
deprivation of physical liberty.” 122 Moreover, legal counsel
would likely only be available ex post, resulting in a minimal effect on the initial fast failure decision. I attempt to resolve this
ex post problem in Section IV with a modest educational program that could provide baseline guidance to borrowers prior
to their fast failure decision.
In the end, the expected value of fast failure for the minority entrepreneur is distorted by the costs of discrimination,
cultural aversion, and lack of access to counsel. While the SBA
loan guarantee program provides increased access to capital for
the minority entrepreneur, it does not directly address these
costs. Likewise, while access to a public defender would help
the minority entrepreneur resolve debt disputes ex post, it
would fail to address the lack of guidance when making their
fast failure decision. In the next section, I discuss direct solutions to diminishing these distortion costs and helping the minority entrepreneur face the same fast failure decision as the
typical entrepreneur.

IV. PROPOSALS TO DIMINISH THE DISTORTION
COSTS ON THE FAST FAILURE DECISION FOR
MINORITY ENTREPRENEURS
If minority entrepreneurs delay failure because of the
distortion costs described above, they will likely use resources
inefficiently. Further, they will not be able to compete with
121.
122.

Id. at S9.
Id. at S5 (citing Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 31 (1981)).
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non-minority entrepreneurs who engaged in similarly failed
ventures and were able to innovate and learn from such ventures. Thus, to both ensure the efficient reallocation of resources as well as equality of opportunity for minority entrepreneurs, it is imperative to diminish these distortion costs.
In the following section, I present a set of possible remedies to diminish the distortion costs discussed above. I begin
by describing a possible private ordering solution to discrimination and cultural aversion costs through the emerging peer-topeer (P2P) lending industry. While P2P lending still remains
promising, it is unclear whether it can resolve these concerns in
its current form because of ambiguities in the law surrounding
these lending platforms as well as social network effects that
could potentially incur an increase in discrimination.
Without a private ordering solution, I turn to a set of
incremental regulatory proposals. First, I propose a modest
mandatory educational program for small business borrowers
that would decrease access to counsel costs by informing them
of the efficiencies of failing fast as well as utilizing formal lending services and bankruptcy laws. Next, to diminish discrimination costs, I initially propose a blind loan application process
that would isolate the instances in which discrimination could
occur and ensure that race is not a factor in the loan application
process. Yet, because relying on non-racial data may permit
lending institutions to still rely heavily on red-lining and other
disparate impact tactics, I propose a higher standard for banks
when assessing a loan application that directly confronts disparate impact. Finally, to diminish remaining disparate impact discrimination and cultural aversion costs, I propose a loan guarantee program like the SBA Loan Guarantee program that is
targeted directly at minority entrepreneurs.
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A. Peer-to-Peer Lending

P2P lending essentially provides an online platform for
individuals (and institutions) “to borrow and loan money.” 123P2P lending could diminish the distortion costs of discrimination by providing a method for minority entrepreneurs
to apply for a loan without revealing their race. Further, it can
diminish the distortion costs associated with a minority entrepreneur’s cultural aversions to formal borrowing by making the
transaction more private and accessible. That said, P2P lending
may actually lead to increased discrimination costs because individual lenders are not regulated by the ECOA, nor the
Community Reinvestment Act (CRA). 124 Further, because P2P
lending currently serves only a minimal number of small businesses, 125 it is unclear whether it will be able to move into the
small business loan market.
My description of P2P focuses on “the two primary platforms,” Prosper and Lending Club, which currently facilitate
“98% of [P2P] loans in the United States.” 126 These lending institutions allow potential borrowers to begin their quest for a
loan by completing an application on their host website. 127 This
application typically requires providing only a home address,
email, type of loan, loan amount requested, employment status,
annual income, credit score, and age. 128 To qualify for a loan
123. Zachary Adams Mason, Online Loans Across State Lines: Protecting Peer-to-Peer
Lending Through the Exportation Doctrine, 105 GEO. L.J. 217, 220 (2016–17).
124. 12 U.S.C. § 2901; see Lisa T. Alexander, Cyberfinancing for Economic Justice, 4

WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 310, 336 (2012–13). I describe this Act in further detail below.
125. See Mason, supra note 123, at 227 (explaining that the two major P2P lenders primarily serve customers looking to consolidate debt, and that only 2% of their customers borrow
for a “business” purpose).
126. Id. at 221. Kiva is an additional well-known P2P platform, but because it is a nonprofit, it has a relatively small market share, and it is mostly focused on microlending, id. at
221, I omit it from my discussion.
127. Id. at 222.
128. See generally Get Your Custom Rate, PROSPER,
https://www.prosper.com/borrower/#/prospect/registration?loan_amount=35000&listing_categ
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from Prosper, “the applicant must: ‘(1) have at least a 640 credit
score, (2) have fewer than seven credit bureau inquiries within
the last 6 months, (3) have an annual income greater than $0,
(4) have a debt-to-income ratio below 50%, (5) have at least
three open trades reported on their credit report, and (6) have
not filed for bankruptcy within the last 12 months.’” 129 Lending
Club has a slightly more strict standards for “screening potential borrowers,” including verification of applicants’ selfreported employment information 130 and a credit score requirement of 660. 131
As should be clear from the discussion above, credit
scores can be used as a form of disparate impact discrimination
against minority entrepreneurs. The credit score requirements
for P2P lending came as a response to “increased scrutiny by
the SEC.” 132 While a 640 credit score “is considered fair,” and
“[p]eople with this credit score may be considered subprime
borrowers,” 133 this bar may be too high for minority entrepreneurs who have no credit history or a minimal credit history
that is predominately negative. 134 This effect may be evidenced
by the fact that Prosper and Lending Club’s current loan appli-

ory_id=3&credit_quality_id=3&offer_code=0&prospect_id=CA7F126B-6E02-456F-9B8897B5B437B0C0&ref_ac=GoogSearch&ref_mc=BorGenAcq&ref_d=cm:SEMBrand%7C%7Ckw:prosper%7C%7Cad:104726616971%7C%7Cdv:c&type=dm (last visited
July 5, 2017); Check Your Rate, LENDING CLUB (last accessed July 5, 2017),
https://www.lendingclub.com/apply/personal/identity?utm_campaign=pl_biz_purpose&loanA
mount=40000&loanPurpose=small_business&creditScore=POOR.
129. Mason, supra note 123, at 222 n.34 (quoting Prosper Funding LLC & Prosper
Marketplace, Inc., Prospectus at 32 (Form 424(b)(3)) (Aug. 13, 2015)
https://www.prosper.com/Downloads/Legal/Prosper_Prospectus_2015-08-13.pdf).
130. Id. at 224 (citing Paul Slattery, Square Pegs in A Round Hole: SEC Regulation of
Online Peer-to-Peer Lending and the CFPB Alternative, 30 YALE J. REG. 233 (2013)).
131. Alexander, supra note 124, at 345.
132. Id.
133. 640 Credit Score: Is it Good or Bad? EXPERIAN,
http://www.experian.com/blogs/ask-experian/credit-education/score-basics/640-credit-score/
(last visited July 5, 2017).
134. These credit score requirements roughly approximate the average credit scores of
Black and African Americans (677) as well as Hispanic Americans (701). Robert Harrow, Average Credit Score in America: 2017 Facts & Figures, VALUE PENGUIN (March 29, 2017),
https://www.valuepenguin.com/average-credit-score.
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cation approval rate is only 10%. 135 Therefore, some circumvention of this requirement would likely still be necessary for
P2P lending institutions to diminish disparate impact discrimination costs. 136
Once a potential borrower applies and receives approval
from the lending platform to pursue a loan, the borrower then
posts a request to the platform which “include[s] relevant information about the requested loan.” 137 For Prosper, this includes the term (either three or five years), the rate (between
5.99% and 36%), and the amount that would be borrowed (between $2,000 to $35,000), all of which are “determined by
Prosper . . . based upon the borrower’s credit score.” 138 Potential lenders see these terms as well as the borrower’s “Prosper
Rating”—a letter grade rating prescribed by Prosper. 139 In addition, at the option of the borrowers, they may disclose addi-

135. Mason, supra note 123, at 231 (citing Alexandra Mateescu, Peer-to-Peer Lending,
DATA & SOC’Y RES. INST. 21 (July 1, 2015),
http://www.datasociety.net/pubs/der/PeertoPeerLending.pdf.
136. At some point, if P2P lending integrates with advanced forms of blockchain technology, this threshold for minority entrepreneurs could be diminished because blockchain
would likely resolve the asymmetric information problem. That is, blockchain can “transmit
richer forms of information, holding promise for many compelling applications beyond” simple
monetary value. Trevor I. Kiviat, Note, Beyond Bitcoin: Issues in Regulating Blockchain
Transactions, 65 DUKE L. JOUR. 569, 603 (2015). Instead, a typical transaction follows a simple
script—a set of instructions—that adheres to the three-part structure [of party A sending a value, Party B accepting that value, and other parties verifying the transaction]. If the script were
amended to contain additional conditions, users could engage in more sophisticated transactions. For instance, consider that Party A and Party B may want to add a fourth condition to
that script structure: they only want the transaction to occur at a certain time, or upon the occurrence or nonoccurrence of a conditional event. Many possibilities branch out from this idea,
and it has sparked much discussion around “smart” contracts. Id. at 603 (internal citations omitted).
Thus, a lending platform could integrate certain scripts that precluded loaned
money to be spent on items outside the business, limited the ability of the borrower from attaining additional loans, and automatically enacted a mock bankruptcy when borrowers were
near the zone of insolvency. These scripts are currently unavailable to developers “because protocol amendments require a majority consensus,” but variations on bitcoin do exist and are currently being tested. Id. at 603–04. Should such scripts be adopted, one may want to reevaluate
the credit reporting requirements of these lending platforms as the scripts may trigger liquidation events with which the entrepreneur otherwise would not have proceeded.
137. Mason, supra note 123, at 222.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 222–23.
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tional self-reported information, including “the borrower’s
purpose for requesting the loan, income, occupation, and employment status”; borrowers that provide such “narrative information . . . can positively influence a lender’s decision to
lend to a borrower with an otherwise poor credit rating.” 140
Lenders, or “investors” as they are referred to on these
platforms, “can provide as little as $25 in a requested loan, regardless of the amount requested by the borrower.” 141 If a potential borrower does not receive enough funding over the limited time period of their posting, the transaction is cancelled. 142
However, if a sufficient amount is aggregated, then the transaction is facilitated by Prosper or Lending Club using “WebBank,
a [Utah-]chartered bank insured by the FDIC,” to originate the
loan. 143 This aggregation of loans provides more supply of formal loans for minority entrepreneurs, who may be higher risk
investments, as investors diversify their portfolio. 144
First, P2P lending could diminish the distortion costs
related to cultural aversions to formal lending by providing a
cleaner, simpler process of applying for a loan and leaving less
room for perceived discrimination. 145 P2P lending does not
bundle interest rates with other services; thus, minority entrepreneurs will be able to feel more confident about the terms of
the loans in which they enter. 146 Likewise, it allows members of
minority communities to formally lend to one another, and decreases the shame that might be associated with being denied a
loan from a bank.
In addition, P2P lending can diminish discrimination
costs by allowing minority entrepreneurs to receive a loan
without ever revealing their race. Furthermore, minority entre140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
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Alexander, supra note 124, at 338.
Mason, supra note 123, at 223.
Id. at 223–24.
Id. at 225.
See Alexander, supra note 124, at 338.
See Mason, supra note 123, at 228–29.
Id.
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preneurs may be able to strategically use their race within their
narrative to obtain credit from those particularly interested in
lending to minorities. 147 The application process requires only
that the minority entrepreneur “determine the amount of money he or she needs and the length of time he or she needs to pay
the money back;” 148 it does not involve investigation of the
neighborhood in which the minority entrepreneur resides,
which precludes the ability of lenders to red-line. 149
Yet P2P lending may also increase discrimination costs.
Minority entrepreneurs are more likely to receive lower ratings
because they have lower levels of income, assets, or credit. 150
Therefore, investors may be dissuaded from investing in minority entrepreneurs because of their heightened risk of nonrepayment. In addition, if a minority does reveal their race in
the narrative section, investors are currently permitted to discriminate against them, 151 whether it be conscious or subconscious. 152 For example, if minorities do not share a picture on
the platform to avoid discrimination, but majority entrepreneurs do, then minority entrepreneurs may still be less likely to
receive a loan because they fail to share enough information;
i.e., potential borrowers who disclose minimal information may
appear less trustworthy and attract fewer investors.

147. Cf. Elise Schmelzer, New Website Allows White People to Offer ‘Reparations’ Directly to People of Color, WASH. POST (August 2, 2016),

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2016/08/02/new-website-allowswhite-people-to-offer-reparations-directly-to-people-of-color/?utm_term=.6cbab048ff3b.
148. Mason, supra note 123, at 229.
149. Id. However, it still remains unclear whether Prosper or Lending Club is itself engaging in red-lining when determining their credit measure.
150. See supra note 136 discussing a way of circumventing the credit requirement.
151. This is due to the fact that the ECOA currently appears to only apply to the lending
platform and not the actual lenders. Cf. PETER MANBECK & SAMUEL HU, CHAPMAN &
CUTLER LLP, THE REGULATION OF PEER-TO-PEER LENDING: A SUMMARY OF THE
PRINCIPAL ISSUES 25 (April 2014), http://www.lendacademy.com/wpcontent/uploads/2014/04/Regulation-of-P2P-Lending-Chapman-and-Cutler.pdf.
152. For example, P2P lending could effectually imitate behavior similar to the Microsoft
autobot that quickly became racist. See Rob Price, Microsoft is deleting its AI chatbot’s incredibly racist tweets, BUSINESS INSIDER (March 24, 2016), http://www.businessinsider.com/micro
soft-deletes-racist-genocidal-tweets-from-ai-chatbot-tay-2016-3.
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This problem is further amplified by the fact that there
appears to be no current enforcement of the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) 153 on P2P lenders or platforms. 154 The
CRA “requires banks to meet the credit needs of their entire
communities, including low- and moderate-income (LMI)
neighborhoods.” 155 While the definition of LMI does not take
race into account, it includes many minority neighborhoods. 156
Without enforcement of the CRA, many minority communities
are subject to aggregate discrimination costs, losing access to a
significant credit market.
The CRA is enforced by four agencies. 157 “[R]egulators
review a bank’s determination of its assessment areas [i.e., definitions of “community” into which they must reinvest], and issue public written reports that rate banks’ compliance with
their CRA obligations.” 158 These ratings are considered anytime
a bank applies “to ‘obtain a charter, obtain deposit insurance,
establish a branch, relocate a home office or branch, merge
with another bank, or obtain the assets or assume the liabilities
of another bank.’ A negative CRA rating can cause regulators to
deny a bank permission to engage in these activities.” 159
Enforcement of the CRA on P2P lending platforms is
unique because it is unclear what the assessment area is and
who the lender is. There are likely two options for assessment
areas: (a) borrowers on the platform; or, (b) actual, physical
neighborhoods of borrowers. 160 In addition, there are likely

153.
154.
155.

12 U.S.C. § 2901.

See Alexander, supra note 124, at 378–79.
Richard D. Marsico, Enforcing the Community Reinvestment Act: An Advocate’s
Guide to Making the CRA Work for Communities, 17 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 129, 129

(2000–01).
156. Alexander, supra note 124, at 329.
157. Marisco, supra note 154, at 131–32.
158. Alexander, supra note 124, at 329–30.
159. Alexander, supra note 124, at 330.
160. Alexander suggests that the “assessment area” be particular “cyberspaces,” yet provides no real meat to this proposal; thus I may summarize it, but I have forgone analyzing it for
now. Cf. Alexander, supra note 124, at 378–80.
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three options for the lender: 1) the platform, 2) the investors, or
3) the bank controlling the transaction—in Prosper and Fair
Lending’s Case, WebBank.
A framework in which the actual, physical neighborhoods of the borrowers serve as the assessment area would likely be impossible to administer. First, given the emerging reach
of P2P lending, P2P lenders would be charged with serving
many physical community definitions with only a few members
in each area. Thus, it would be difficult to determine whether
the platform was adequately serving an LMI area if, for example, the platform served a very wealthy individual in a LMI
community. Further, because geographic information related to
borrowers is not shared with individual investors, they would
have no way of knowing whether they have appropriately
spread their investments to the LMI community of a particular
neighborhood in which they have invested.
Thus, it appears that the platform is the most easily
identified “assessment area,” allowing customers on the platform to be considered the “community.” By relying on this virtual definition of community, the platform can ensure it is
reaching those least likely to have access to formal lending from
those who apply on its platform. That said, these platforms
would still need to be regulated so that they did not make
themselves to be unattractive to minority entrepreneurs.
With respect to the question of who the “lender” is, it is
unlikely to be the individual investor as it would be extraordinarily difficult for a regulator, not to mention the investor herself, to determine whether the loans she provides are proportionately being made to members of the LMI community
within the platform. One way around this would be for regulators to require platforms to be configured so that a percentage
of each investors’ investments go towards an LMI borrower.
That said, doing so may significantly dissuade lenders from the
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platform if as it requires many lenders to increase their risk tolerance. 161
It is also unlikely that the bank controlling the transaction—in our case WebBank—could be considered the lender,
because it is simply a facilitator of the loans and does not have
control over the lending platform. Thus, the platform is likely
the most easily regulated “lender” faced with bearing the burden of ensuring that LMI members of its community are receiving an appropriate amount of loans. The platform could require investors that reach a certain level to put some part of
their investment toward an LMI member. Alternatively, the
platform could subsidize a proportionate number of LMI
members and highlight them on the webpage to encourage
other investors to lend.
In total, it is unlikely that P2P lending is a promising
tool for diminishing the distortion costs of cultural aversion and
discrimination. It is easily accessible by minorities and would
likely not have the same stigma as a bank. That said, it would
still need to be regulated in such a way that it did not create
even more disparate impact discrimination towards minority
borrowers. These regulations could come through adapting the
CRA to P2P lending, requiring the subsidization of loans to
minority entrepreneurs, and developing more minority friendly
borrower standards. One other caveat is that it remains questionable as to whether P2P lending will be able to break into
the business lending market. The typical P2P loan is to provide
debt consolidation; however, only 2% of Prosper and Lending
Club’s customers borrow for a business purpose. 162 This result
is likely due to the relatively low cap on the allowable borrowed

161. That said, such an activity may actually promote minority entrepreneurs further by
requiring interaction between the different social class groups. By doing so, investors who may
have never attempted to engage in such investments may be more willing to invest in future
minority entrepreneurs.
162. Id. at 227.
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amount, namely $35,000. 163 Both Prosper and Lending Club
have developed business loan platforms, OnDeck and Lending
Club: Business Loans, 164 respectively, which permit loans of up
to $500,000 and $300,000. Yet, OnDeck requires that the businesses be operating for at least one year and have a minimum
$100,000 in annual revenue. 165 Similarly, Lending Club requires that the business have a two year operating history with
annual revenue of at least $75,000. 166 These limitations would
likely preclude the minority entrepreneur from gaining access
to start-up costs for their business and act as further distortion
costs within the minority entrepreneur’s fast failure decision.
Thus, despite its promise, it remains uncertain whether P2P
lending will be able to diminish the distortion costs incurred on
the minority entrepreneur’s fast failure decision. With that in
mind, I next turn to a set of incremental regulatory proposals
that provide an alternative, as well as coordinative, route to diminish these distortion costs.

163. See generally PROSPER (last accessed July 5, 2017), https://www.prosper.com/.
164. ONDECK,
https://www.ondeck.com/?targeting=RLSAutm_campaign=Google_Search_Brand_RLSA_All&
pcrid=171825922531&utm_term=ondeck&utm_source=google&pdv=c&pmt=e&utm_medium
=ppcsearch&mkwid=OrimIWuV&network=g&gclid=Cj0KEQjwicfHBRCh6KaMp4asKgBEiQA8GH2x8BjZv8YAVuqmKhJ1ojK75uaeb1uVxQ667Y2fSgC_W4aAuWK8P8HAQ;
LENDING CLUB BUSINESS LOANS (last accessed July 5, 2017),
https://www.lendingclub.com/business/?utm_source=LC&utm_medium=link&utm_campaign=
pl_biz_purpose&u=2 (last visited July 5, 2017).
165. Check Your Rate, PROSPER,
https://www.prosper.com/plp/checkyourratev2/?refac=GoogSearch&refmc=BorGenAcq&refd=
cm:SEMBrand||kw:prosper||ad:104726616971||dv:c&gclid=Cj0KEQjwicfHBRCh6KaMp4asKgBEiQA8GH2x6jPR4fhLjOXacrLtGcrMvUoq6SyLxtcR52gghVFN7IaAi0t8P8HAQ (last
visited July 5, 2017)
166. Id.
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B. Incremental Regulations to Diminish Distortion Costs
Within the Minority Entrepreneur’s Fast Failure Decision
Given the lack of a private ordering solution, 167 the following regulatory suggestions would likely diminish the distortion costs of discrimination, cultural aversion, and access to
counsel found within the minority entrepreneur’s fast failure
decision. First, I propose a mandatory educational program to
accompany SBA loans that would diminish the distortion costs
of cultural aversions and access to legal counsel by informing
the borrower of the benefits of failing fast and the different
types of bankruptcy. Second, to diminish discrimination costs, I
propose that banks be required to defer interactions between a
loan assessor and a potential borrower where discrimination
could occur to isolated instances near the end of the loan approval process. Third, I propose a stricter standard for assessing
loans using big data and avoiding any reliance on personal
judgment. Finally, because even with these regulatory tools,
minority entrepreneurs may still suffer from significant disparate impact discrimination, my fourth proposal is that the government subsidize minority loans through a program similar to
the SBA loan guarantee program.

1. Mandatory educational program encouraging fast failure
As mentioned above, one significant problem for minority entrepreneurs is that they lack access to legal counsel who
can advise the entrepreneur prior to the fast failure decision of
the benefits of fast failure and the mechanisms that encourage
fast failure, such as bankruptcy. 168 My proposal builds on the intuition that if an entrepreneur were required to learn about
these benefits upon receiving a loan, the entrepreneur would

167.
168.
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likely allocate resources would more efficiently because she
would have a better sense as to when she should fail and pursue
bankruptcy.
Currently there is no mandatory educational program
when taking out a small business loan. This contrasts with U.S.
microfinancing, which requires micro-entrepreneurs to participate in several meetings and educational programs. 169 Consistent programs that require significant time commitments dissuade entrepreneurs from participating in microfinancing 170 and
would likely be inappropriate for minority entrepreneurs looking for credit at higher levels. However, a short, one-to-twohour online program that requires entrepreneurs to think
through certain failure situations would not only educate them
on the benefits of failing fast and bankruptcy, but also diminish
their cultural aversions to bankruptcy and failure.
Of course, this program could carry a significant initial
cost because it would require experts in education, business,
and law to construct instructional material. There would also
be costs in tailoring the program to multiple education levels
and languages. That said, the small business loan guarantee
program could easily implement the proposed program by
making it an additional requirement on entrepreneurs before
providing them with a subsidized loan. 171

2. Color-blind loan assessment
Formal lending institutions typically require a face-toface visit before providing a business loan, and often encourage
speaking with a representative. 172 Yet, doing so invites opportu169. See Alexander, supra note 123, at 327.
170. Id.
171. Cf. Steve Nicastro, How to Qualify for a Small-Business Loan in 5 Steps,
NERDWALLET (April 4, 2017) https://www.nerdwallet.com/blog/small-business/how-toqualify-for-small-business-loans/ (discussing the current requirements for qualifying for an SBA
subsidized loan).
172. See, e.g., Securing a Business Line of Credit, BANK OF AMERICA (last visited May 5,
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nities for threshold discriminatory practices. 173 These opportunities for discrimination potentially increase not only the discrimination costs in the model, but also the cultural aversion
costs of individuals who may feel threatened by the institution
that engages in discriminatory lending.
Thus, I propose that banks be required to provide sufficient tools online for an entrepreneur to apply for a small business loan without ever revealing their racial identity. Banks are
already transitioning to a more online presence and this tool
would be another step in that direction. Alternatively, if lenders
insist that they must meet the borrower before issuing a loan,
the meeting should be the last step before receiving the loan.
Placing the meeting last would effectively reduce perceptions of
discrimination and isolate any potential discriminatory actions,
diminishing discrimination costs.
This regulation could be integrated within the comprehensive “Regulation B” that currently implements the ECOA.
Regulation B forbids creditors from “request[ing] or collect[ing] information about an applicant’s race,” except in “situations in which the information is necessary to test for compliance with fair lending rules,” or “[t]o determine the applicant’s
eligibility for special purpose credit programs.” 174 The CFPB,
which currently enforces Regulation B, could interpret this
regulation to mean that banks must avoid requesting such information and require banks organize as color-blind a process
for potential borrowers as possible.
Ensuring that loan applications remain color-blind
would likely diminish discrimination costs as well as cultural
aversion costs developed from perceived discrimination. That
2017), https://www.bankofamerica.com/smallbusiness/business-financing/workingcapital/business-line-of-credit.go; Small Business Credit, WELLS FARGO (last visited May 5,
2017), https://www.wellsfargo.com/biz/business-credit/.
173. See supra Section III.A.
174. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, EQUAL CREDIT OPPORTUNITY ACT
(ECOA) (June 2013), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201306_cfpb_laws-andregulations_ecoa-combined-june-2013.pdf (summarizing 12 CFR 1002.5).
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said, increasing the color-blindness of the application process
may lead to more active red-lining that is untraced because of a
lack of initial data, leading to my next proposal.

3. Big data loan and credit assessment
In the world of big data, traditional tests for determining
the interest rate of a potential borrower based on zip codes or
neighborhoods are likely outdated and inundated with prejudice. While there are potentially significant risks to using big
data to assess the creditworthiness of an entrepreneur, 175 lending institutions should be mandated to use the most detailed
predictive data that they are cost-effectively capable of utilizing.
Further, banks should be required to ensure that their data will
not have a disparate impact on minority entrepreneurs.
Once again, this requirement could be integrated
through Regulation B. Currently, Regulation B prohibits using
information that has “the effect of discriminating against an applicant on a prohibited basis.” 176 Yet, “Regulation B neither requires nor endorses any particular method of credit analysis”
and permits creditors to “use traditional methods, such as
judgmental systems that rely on a credit officer’s subjective
evaluation of an applicant’s creditworthiness . . . .” 177
Regulation B should require that any subjective evaluation be deferred until the final step of the application process.
Subjective evaluations open the assessment up to stereotypes
that typically infect a judgment process when the evaluator is
less motivated to actually make an independent assessment. 178
Because minority entrepreneurs already are likely to have more
175. See generally Mikella Hurley & Julius Adebayo, Credit Scoring in the Era of Big
Data, 18 YALE J.L. & TECH. 148 (2016) (describing the challenges with transparency in using

big data to calculate credit scores).
176. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, supra note 183, at 6 (emphasis in original).
177. Id.
178. See Galen v. Bodenhausen Stereotypes as Judgmental Heuristics: Evidence of Circadian Variations in Discrimination, 1 PSYCHOL. SCI. 319, 319 (1990).
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credit difficulties, as well as less revenue than their majority
counterparts, 179 loan application assessors may use these characteristics, combined with stereotypes, to simply reject the loan
application. However, if the applicant’s race was not revealed
until the end of the assessment stage, the evaluator would have
more pressure to ensure the assessment was independent and
not based on race, because regulators could more easily isolate
whether race was the final variable that prevented the loan applicant from receiving a fair loan.
Therefore, by requiring banks to utilize big data methods that are purposefully designed to avoid disparate impact
discrimination—and by postponing the revelation of race, as
well as subjective evaluations, until the final step in the loan application process—discrimination and cultural aversion costs
would likely see a significant decrease. That said, it may be
practically impossible to design a big data assessment tool that
completely evades disparate impact discrimination, which
means further interference is necessary to balance the scales: affirmative subsidies.

4. Affirmative subsidies for minority entrepreneurs
As discussed above, minority entrepreneurs are typically
less creditworthy and have less revenue than their majority
counterparts. 180 Thus, even the most sophisticated big data
tools may effect a disparate impact on minorities. 181 To combat
this disparate impact and ensure the distortion costs of discrimination are diminished for minority entrepreneurs, the SBA
should create a loan guarantee program specifically target minority entrepreneurs. This program would provide minorities
with loans that have higher government guarantees, incentiviz-

179.
180.
181.
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ing lenders to target minority entrepreneurs as profitable customers.
As discussed above, the SBA loan guarantee program has significantly increased economic performance in minority communities. 182 That said, it remains unclear whether it is actually diminishing the individual costs of discrimination for minority
entrepreneurs. 183 Targeting minority entrepreneurs with a similar, more attractive loan guarantee program would likely diminish such costs and incentivize financial institutions to invest in
minority entrepreneurs. 184

V. CONCLUSION
In this comment, I provided a novel model of the typical
entrepreneur’s fast failure decision, examining the social costs
and benefits associated with this decision as well as how formal
lending and bankruptcy make fast failure possible. Further, I
distinguished the minority entrepreneur’s fast failure decision
from her majority counterpart’s decision by highlighting the
additional distortion costs on the minority entrepreneur: discrimination, cultural aversion, and access to legal counsel. I
spelled out the weaknesses of current attempts to diminish
these costs and introduced five proposals that would more directly work to put the minority entrepreneur on par with her
majority counterpart: P2P lending; a mandatory “fast failure”
education program; a color-blind application process; an assessment system that emphasizes big data and strays from sub-

182. Craig et al., supra note 97, at 92.
183. Id. at 92–93.
184. Such a program would, of course, need to be implemented with care; however, due
to limited space in this essay, I have not specified the particular details of such a proposal. For
other programs that incentivize minority entrepreneurship, see Paul M. Ong, Set-Aside Contracting in S.B.A.’s 8(a) Program, REV. OF BLACK POL.ECON. 59 (2001); Jess H. Drabkin, Mi-

nority Enterprise Development and the Small Business Administration’s Section 8(a) Program:
Constitutional Basis and Regulatory Implementation, 49 BROOK. L. REV. 433 (1982-83).
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jective evaluation; and a minority loan subsidy program. Each
of these proposals deserve more time to work out their nuances,
but I hope this comment provides a groundwork for that project.
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